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REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS
FOR TITLE OPINIONS*
The Committee on Standards of the Real Property Section of the
American Bar Association has for several years offered encouragement
to the various State Bar Associations in promoting standardization
and agreement among their members as to the types of defects which
are sufficiently immaterial to be disregarded in giving opinions of
title. The work has gone forward in a great many states and in most
cases outstanding results are being obtained. This Committee now
exists in this state for the first time.
Most of us are fully aware of the curse attending the over-meticulous examination of titles. See 17 Nebraska Law Bulletin 4; "The
Over-Meticulous Title Examiner as a Nuisance to the Public and to
the Profession." Many of us are guilty ourselves-partly because
up to the present there has been no satisfactory way of determining
"when a defect is not a defect." A client goes to one attorney and
obtains an opinion of title thinking he can rest secure that he has bought
property with a marketable title. When he goes to sell, however, the
purchaser has the abstract examined by a different attorney who says
that a foreclosure sale was held on improper notice back in 1910.
What can the first client reasonably think? Either his confidence in
his lawyer is shaken or his regard for the profession as a whole is
lessened. Not infrequently it is even" suggested by the seller that the
second examining attorney is attempting to promote a quiet title action.
The probability is that the objection raised by the second lawyer is
not a real defect, and in most cases the objection was made solely
because the second examiner is afraid that the next attorney who
examines will also raise the point, thus challenging his opinion. The
*Adopted by the Washington State Bar Association at its annual meeting
at Spokane on September 25, 1942.

1942]

STANDARDS

third examiner may be moved by similar consideration, and so a vicious
circle is established.
Again, each examiner, remembering his own clients coming in with
an adverse report on a title which he had previously passed, is inclined
to take out his spite on the next abstract he has occasion to examine
by taking exception to every uncrossed "t" or undotted "i." In this
manner we are causing each other no end of trouble and are making
a nuisance of ourselves to the public. If we can but agree in advance
to pass over certain types of alleged defects, not only will we greatly
relieve our own individual difficulties as examiners but we shall also
have done a public relations job for the entire profession.
At the outset there are two fundamentals which should be kept in
mind. First, an examining attorney is giving merely an opinion of the
title. The law protects him if he has used the care of a reasonably
prudent title examiner-it does not require him to be 100 per cent
accurate. Second, the object of examination is to ascertain if the
abstract shows a marketable title, not a letter perfect title. As stated
in Cummings v. Dolan, (52 Wash. 496):
"The authorities hold that to render a title marketable it
is only necessary that it shall' be free from reasonable doubt,
in other words, that a purchaser is not entitled to demand a
title free from every possible technical suspicion; he can only
demand such title as a reasonably well informed and intelligent
purchaser acting upon business principles would be willing to
accept."
On the first proposition, if an examiner follows the standards set
up by us after careful consideration and conference and after submission and acceptance by the bar, he will almost certainly, so far as those
standards are involved, be satisfying the care required of a reasonably
prudent title examiner.
This does not mean that the standards proposed by this committee
will necessarily conform to ultimate decisions of the courts, or that
such standards have any legal effect in themselves. But this does not
destroy their usefulness, as has been demonstrated by the successful
working of the plan in other states. Successive committees will correct
our standards if and when they prove erroneous. Until that time we
can rely on them just as we rely on a court decision until it is overruled.
So far as possible, controversial matters have been avoided and every
effort made to avoid giving the semblance of judicial importance to
any of the proposed standards.
The method of procedure adopted by the committee follows generally the system used in other states. Actual problems taken from the
experience of our members have been gathered together and after
study and consideration a recommendation has been made. These
represent only a start on what may eventually be done by subsequent
committees. Many of the problems may seem to deal with triflesyet it is so often the trifling defect which causes the trouble. It is
hoped that these problems and answers will be approved with the
acceptance of this report and that members of the bar will assist the
efforts of the committee toward uniformity by following said standards
and by submitting to the committee the problems which they encounter
in their own abstract examinations.
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The aim of your committee has been to liberalize standards for title
opinions so far as reasonably permissible. At the same time, it should
be pointed out that title examinations indicate many inexcusable errors
made by attorneys, and it is hoped that nothing herein will encourage
carelessness or lax methods on the part of the bar in connection with
documents and proceedings affecting real estate titles.
Your committee respectfully moves:
1. That this report be accepted, together with the standards hereto
attached.
2. That a permanent file be kept for the reports and standards of
this committee.
3. That the publication of this report and of said standards be
authorized.
Respectfully submitted,
HERMAN BROWN,

KENNETH ROEGNER,
RICHARD A. HOGAN,
ELWOOD HUTCHESON,

H. M.

RAMBLEN,

Chairman.
1
No.
Standard
Problem:
Most U. S. Government patents have been issued subject to vested
and accrued water rights, the right to extract ore, and rights-of-way for
ditches and canals. Shall we list these matters as encumbrances in our
title opinions?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the attorney list said matters in his title
opinion, with the added statement that no objection to the marketability
of the title is made on that account.
See Dopps v. Alderman, 112 Wash. Dec. 90 (Jan. 17, 1942).
No. 2
Problem:
Some U. S. Government patents, particularly those issued to railroads, contain a clause: "Excluding and excepting all mineral lands
should any such be found. .. " May we disregard this exception in our
title opinions?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that no exception be listed in our title opinions
on this account.
Comment:
The issuance of a U. S. Government patent (except when based on
mineral claims) has been held to be a conclusive determination by the
Government that the land is agricultural and non-mineral bearing and
exceptions such as the foregoing are void.
See Burke v. S. P. R. Co., 58 L. Ed. 1527.
No. 3
Problem:
State deeds expressly reserve and except "all oils, gases, coal, ores,
minerals and fossils ... and the right to explore," subject, however, to
the requirement that full payment must be made to the owner for
damage to his land in event the state exercises such rights.
See REM. REV. STATS. 7797-56.
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Recommendation:
It is recommended that where title is derived under such a state
deed, that the attorney list such exceptions and reservations in his title
opinion with the added statement that no objection to the marketability
of the title is made on that account.
No. 4
Problem:
Many railroad deeds, particularly from the N. P. R. R. Co. and
N. P. Ry. Co., contain reservations of railroad rights-of-way and of
coal and iron lands.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the examining attorney list such reservations
in his title opinion.
Comment:
A floating railroad right-of-way is not extinguished by non-user or
by ordinary adverse possession. See 142 Wash. 204.
The purchaser or mortgagee for whom an attorney is examining
will ordinarily be justified in accepting the title subject to the above
exceptions on the basis of a reliable affidavit or report that no railroad
has been located and that the lands in question are non-coal or mineral
bearing.
No. 5
Problem:
May interlopers in the chain of title be disregarded?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that a conveyance or mortgage appearing in the
abstract from a person who appears never to have had any connection
with the property may be disregarded as not constituting any cloud on
the title, except where the conveyance or mortgage is the last instrument in the chain of title.
Comment:
See Cummings v. Dolan, 52 Wash. 496.
No. 6
Problem:
When may discrepancies in names or initials of parties in the chain
of title be disregarded?
Recommendation:
(a) In identifying a grantor with a prior grantee, it is recommended
that the following discrepancies be disregarded unless the abtract discloses other information creating a reasonable doubt
as to the identity:
1. If the party is designated by a full Christian (given) name
and a full surname (family name), discrepancies in the
spelling of either or both may be disregarded so long as the
pronunciation remains unchanged.
2. If the party is designated by a full Christian and full surname
plus a middle initial, discrepancies in the initials may be
disregarded. e.g. Lewis E. Haywood and Lewis R. Haywood.
3. If a party is designated in one place by a full Christian name
and in another place simply by initials, identity should be
established by affidavit or otherwise, unless the last discrepancy is more than 10 years old, in which case the discrepancy may be disregarded if the first initial corresponds
to the first letter in the Christian name.
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(b) Where the discrepancy appears in a court proceeding affecting
the title in which process or notice is served on the owner and
he does not appear, the discrepancy may not be disregarded,
unless the pronunciation thereof is substantially the same within
the rule of iden sonans.
Comments
See generally Kelly v. Kuhnhausen, 51 Wash. 193; Carney v. Bigham, 51 Wash. 452.
No. 7
Problem:
1. May an examiner disregard the omission of a notarial seal on the
acknowledgment of a recorded conveyance?
2. May other defects in the form of an acknowledgement of a recorded conveyance be disregarded?
Recommendation:
1. It is recommended that omission of the seal be disregarded if the
deed is 10 years old, or if it be shown that the notary was in fact
duly commissioned at the time the acknowledgment was taken.
2. Defects in the form may be disregarded, although good practice
will suggest correction of the defect and re-recording wherever
it is possible.
Comment:
See In re Deaver's Estate, 151 Wash. 454; R m. REv. STAT. Sec.
10599.
No. 8
Problem:
May an examiner pass over a conveyance or a release executed by a
corporation on which the corporate seal is omitted?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that such defect be passed, if the authority of the
officers to execute the instrument can be otherwise established, or if
the deed is at least 10 years old.
Comment:
See Oldfield v. Angeles Brewing & Malting Co., 77 Wash. 158.
No. 9
Problem:
In support of a corporation's conveyance, mortgage or release, must
the resolution or other authority for the same be supplied?
Recommendation:
Not if the instrument is
1. Executed by the president or vice-president and secretary, and also
2. Is either under corporate seal or is at least 10 years old.
No. 10
Problem:
When may a contract of sale be disregarded-title having been retained, or conveyed to someone other than the contract purchaser, and
there being of record no relinquishment or quitclaim deed from the
contract purchaser.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that if the contract contains a specific provision
for consummation on or before a fixed time, that after the lapse of ten
years from the expiration of the time limit, it should no longer be considered an encumbrance, provided it is shown that purchaser or others
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claiming under purchaser have not been in possession within the last 10
years.
No. ll
Problem:
After what period of time may an unreleased mortgage be disregarded?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the title be certified in disregard of the mortgage if there has been reasonable activity in the title for a period of 30
years without recognition of the unreleased interests.
Comment:
"Reasonable activity" may be considered too indefinite a criterion,
but this is a situation where some discretion must necessarily be exercised. Ordinarily, if, spread over the 30-year period suggested, there
are at least five instruments such as warranty deeds or mortgages
which would be expected to refer to old claims if there were any substance to them, the title should be considered reasonably active.
No. 12
Problem:
A mortgage is placed of record followed by the recording of a "correction mortgage" which corrects or revises the first instrument in
some regard and contains a recital to that effect. The correction mortgage in due course is released, but the original mortgage is not. Is it
necessary to require a release of the original mortgage?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the title be passed without requiring a release of the original mortgage.
No. 13
Problem:
May the examining attorney pass a mortgage as released when the
release properly describes the date and amount of the mortgage but
fails to refer to the book and page of recording?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that such mortgage be treated as released if the
abstract shows only one mortgage which fits the description as to
date and amount shown in the release and if the abstractor will add a
notation that there is of record no other mortgage between the same
parties of the same date and amount covering this or any other property.
No. 14
Problem:
May the examining attorney pass a mortgage as released when the
release shows the correct book and page of recording but shows an
incorrect date or an incorrect amount for the mortgage?
Recommendation:
It isrecommended that the mortgage be passed as released if the
abstractor will add a notation that there is no other mortgage of record
between the same parties on this or any other property of the date
or amount referred to in the release.
No. 15
Problem:
May the examining attorney pass a mortgage as released when the
release identifies the mortgage by correct date and amount but refers
to the wrong book and page of recording?
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Recommendation:
It is recommended that the mortgage be passed as released if the
abstracter will add a notation showing that there is no other mortgage
between the same parties recorded at the book and page referred to in
the release, and that there is no other mortgage of record between the
same parties having the same date or for the same amount.
No. 16
Problem:
A deed runs to a grantee without showing name of grantee's wife,
or grantee's martial status. Later grantee and his wife convey the
property away without any recital that they were husband and wife at
the time they acquired title. May an examining attorney pass the title
in this condition?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the title be not certified without objection
on this account unless it appears from other instruments in the abstract
or from reasonable collateral inquiry that grantee had the same wife
or was unmarried at the time he acquired title.
Comment:
Strictly speaking, it is possible for the wife of a grantee to have
died (or to have been divorced) after title was acquired and the grantee
to have remarried before conveying so that if the first wife died leaving
children the title to an undivided one-half would be vested in them
(or in case of divorce in the divorced wife). As a practical matter,
however, experience shows that it is almost impossible for this to
happen without some notice thereof appearing in the records. There
are thousands of conveyances which fail to name the grantee's wife
and it is often impossible to secure any showing with reference thereto.
This is a situation where the extent of the inquiry to be made must
be determined by each examiner in the light of the particular case.
No. 17
Problem:
A deed is given to John Smith, trustee, without naming a beneficiary
and without setting forth any trust. There is no declaration of trust
or other trust instrument shown in the abstract. Thereafter, there
is a conveyance from John Smith, trustee. May the conveyance be
considered sufficient?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the conveyance be considered sufficient in
the following circumstances:
1. If the instrument creating the trust is obtained and placed of
record showing trustee's authority to convey, or
2. If the conveydnce is 30 years old and John Smith's wife joined
in executing the deed-no further reference to any trust being
made in later instruments.
3. If (for more recent conveyances) the wife joins in the deed and
satisfactory showing by affidavit is made that there were in fact
no trust restrictions.
See Davidson v. Mantor, 45 Wash. 660; Reilly v. Hopkins, 133
Wash. 425.
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No. 18
Problem:
There is a conveyance to A without any showing or indication of A's
marital status. Later A conveys, again without any indication of
marital status. An affidavit is supplied showing that A was unmarried
at the time of acquiring title. May the examiner pass the conveyance
on the basis of such an affidavit?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the conveyance be passed.
Comment:
See Singer v. Guy Investment Co) 60 Wash. 674.
Problem:
No. 19
There is a conveyance to A. Later X, Y and Z convey the property
by deed containing a recital that X, Y and Z are the sole heirs at law
of A, deceased. A disinterested affidavit is also supplied showing that
X, Y and Z are the sole heirs of A. May the title be passed in this
condition without probate of A's estate?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the title be passed if the conveyance from
the heirs is 30 years old and if the affidavit establishes the death of A,
prior to 1901 (when the inheritance tax law was enacted) or if subsequent thereto, that waiver from the inheritance tax division be
obtained.
Comment:
It is recognized that ordinarily an affidavit to establish heirship will
not be accepted as sufficient (See Crosby v. Wynkoop, 56 Wash. 475).
Nevertheless, where a disinterested affidavit is supplied and the deed
from the heirs is at least 30 years old, so that subsequent owners have
held under color of title for a period exceeding the combined total of
21 years plus the statutory limitation period, it is thought that an
examiner may reasonably consider the title marketable.
Of course, if there is no deed from the heirs the title cannot be
passed simply on the strength of probate proceedings on the estate of A's
spouse. (See France v. Freeze, 4 Wash. (2nd) 124).
No. 20
Problem:
It appears from the abstract that a deed in the chain of title was
placed of record after the grantor (or one of the grantors) died.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that a reliable affidavit be obtained showing when
the deed was delivered and if possible the actual consideration paid.
If the delivery was made prior to grantor's death, the deed may be
treated as a valid conveyance:
If the deed was delivered within two years of grantor's death and
the full market value was not paid therefor, an objection may be noted
covering the possibility of a lien for state inheritance tax or federal
estate tax.
Aiiy deed delivered after grantor's death will not be passed as valid.
No. 21
Problem:
May title be passed based upon a recorded statutory community contract between husband and wife?
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Recommendation:
It is recommended that the same be approved upon proper showing
of record by affidavit or otherwise that the spouse has been deceased
for more than six years, that the parties were married at the time of
such decease and that the property is exempt from inheritance and
estate taxes, or that the same have been fully paid.
(See Rem. Rev. Stat. 1368, 6894).
No. 22
Problem:
Under what circumstances may the conveyance of a person who has
been committed to a state institution in insanity proceedings and subsequently discharged as recovered, be regarded as sufficient?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that such a conveyance be considered sufficient
where an order restoring to competency has been entered in the proceedings under which such person was committed.
No. 23
Problem:
Under what circumstances may a deed or mortgage executed by an
executor under a non-intervention will be passed where the estate is
in process of probate?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that such deed or mortgage be passed in either of
the following situations:
1. Where the will contains specific authority for the conveyance
in question and there are no inheritance taxes or such taxes have
been paid, or
2. Where an order of solvency has been entered and a showing is
made that the conveyance is for an administrative purpose and
there are no inheritance taxes or such taxes have been paid; or
3. Where a petition to sell or mortgage is presented to the court
showing necessity for selling of mortgaging for administrative
purposes and the regular procedure followed as prescribed by
statute for intestate estates.
No. 24
Problem:
May the examining attorney pass a mortgage as released when the
release is executed by the executor or administrator of the estate of the
mortgagee, which is in course of probate in another county or state?
Recommendation:
It is recommended that such mortgage be treated as released if certified copies of the portions of the foreign probate showing due and
proper appointment and qualification of such executor or administrator
be recorded in the county where the real property is situated and showing made that the letters have not been revoked at the time of executing
the release.
No. 25
Problem:
A mortgage held by a corporation is released by an attorney-in-fact
acting under a properly executed, acknowledged and recorded power
of attorney from the corporation. Is it necessary for the release to bear
the corporate seal?

1942]

STANDARDS

Recommendation:
It is recommended that the release be passed without the corporate
seal.
No. 26
Problem:
A, a mortgagor, conveys the real property subject to the mortgage to
B, the mortgagee.
Recommendation:
1. Where the deed contains the recital that it is given in extinguishment of the mortgage and the debt secured thereby, such deed
may be treated as extinguishing the mortgage and transferring
the fee interest to the mortgagee.
2. Where the deed contains no recital of intention of extinguishing
the mortgage by the conveyance, there is only a presumption of
merger, the ultimate effect depending upon the intention of the
parties. Such deed may be given effect as an absolute conveyance,
where the mortgagee executes a release, or where he subsequently
conveys with a warrant against the encumbrance.
Comment:
The vital and essential thing to the validity of a deed taken in lieu
of foreclosure of a mortgage is that the debt secured by the mortgage
must be cancelled. If that is not done and the relation of debtor and
creditor continues, then the mortgage lien continues.
Problem:

No. 27

The abstract shows that the patent from the United States has not
been recorded, there being merely a takeoff from the records of the
U. S. Land Office.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that the attorney make note of this fact, and
recommend that the patent, or a certified copy thereof be recorded,
with the added statement that no objection to the marketability of the
tile is made on that account.
Comment:
Title by patent from the United States is title by record and neither
delivery to the patentee nor recording of the patent in the office of the
county auditor is necessary in order to give it validity. The patent
should be recorded, however, in order that the evidence of title may
be readily available.
See Sayward v. Thompson, 11 Wash. 706.
No. 28
Problem:
The abstract shows an unreleased claini of lien of mechanics or
material men's that has been filed for a period in excess of eight calendar months.
Recommendation:
The treatment of such liens is largely a matter within the discretion
of the examiier based on consideration of the facts of each case. If the
lien notice contains no statements, about the extension of credit, liens
of small amount may be safely ignored after eight months from the
date of filing. Liens of large amounts should be investigated before
being pasesd and if possible release should be required, unless at least
two years old.
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Comment:
Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec. 1138, provides that no such lien shall bind
the property subject to the lien for a longer period than eight calendar
months after the claim has been filed, unless an action be commenced
in the proper court within that time to enforce such lien; or if credit
be given, then eight calendar months after the expiration of such
credit. The Supreme Court has not decided whether the credit given
must be stated in the lien notice in order to extend the lien beyond
eight months. If an effective extension may be given without such extension being set forth in he notice, then it cannot be determined from
the records whether a lien is outlawed.
No. 29
Problem:
Secs. 841 and 842, Rem. Rev. Stat. refer to the serving of "notice"
on tenants in common in partition proceedings. Is the requirement
satisfied by the serving of a summons in regular form.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that service of summons be considered sufficient.
BAR BRIEFS
The annual meeting of the Washington State Bar Association and
Association of Superior Court Judges was held in joint convention at
the Hotel Davenport, Spokane, on September 25 and 26, 1942. On
account of war conditions, it was practically completely devoted to
business, but the members of the Spokane Bar were most hospitable
in their welcome and provided a very enjoyable stag supper and entertainment at the Round Table Room of the Desert Hotel on the evening
of September 25. Among the interesting matters presented to the convention and not otherwise noted in this issue of THE JOURNAL was a
debate upon a proposed bill abolishing the defense of contributory
negligence and creating a rule of comparative negligence in civil actions
for the recovery of damage arising out of negligence. Upon conclusion of the debate the Bar Association resolved to abandon any action
towards sponsoring or recommending passage of any bill substituting
the comparative negligence rule for the rule of contributory negligence.
The Honorable Scott Z. Henderson was selected President of the
Washington State Bar Association for the ensuing year and the Honorable
Charles W. Hall was selected President of the Association of Superior
Court Judges.
The Legislative Committee of the Association requests all persons
desiring to submit bills for the consideration of the committee to deliver
the same in complete form immediately to the Bar Association office.
Briefs in support of submitted bills are helpful. Assistance with respect
to bills may be obtained from any member of the committee.
Judge Charles H. Leavy was sworn into office at a special session
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Southern Division, at Tacoma, on August 1, 1942. Judge John
C. Bowen presided, with Judge Edward E. Cushman, Judge Jeremiah
Neterer and Judge Lloyd L. Black on the bench. Judge Cushman
administered the oath of office to Judge Leavy, and Judge Bowen expressed for the Court its pleasure in receiving Judge Leavy as a member.

